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The United States and Cuba have had a long and often tempestuous
relationship. Decades before the Spanish-American War, Americans looked
at Cuba with great covetousness. The island has variously been envisioned
as a natural and proper addition to the United States, as a vast sugar
factory with unlimited potential for markets and profits and as a
strategic bastion which held the key to the security of the Caribbean, Gulf
of Mexico and indeed, the southern flank of the United States. Manifest
destiny, democratic idealism and a strong belief that peace and prosperity
followed the Yankee trader all played their roles in shaping the relations
between Cuba and its northern neighbor.
In 1898, the United States eagerly went to war to free Cuba from the
yoke of Spanish tyranny. The Teller Amendment proclaimed to the world that
the United States' aims were not to exercise sovereignty or control over
Cuba but to bring peace to the strife torn island and leave the task of
government to the Cubans.
The Treaty of Paris concluded the war, granted independence to Cuba
and in 1902, Cuba became a republic. Cuban acceptance of the Piatt
Amendment guaranteed the United States' right to intervene in Cuban affairs
2in order to preserve Cuban independence, government and liberty. Thus, the
island nation came under the paternal wing of the United States.
The interregnum between American ascendancy in 1898 and Castro's
revolution over sixty years later has been called "the prelude to
S. E. Morison and H. S. Commanger, The Growth of the American Republic





tragedy." American policy in regard to Cuba during these sixty years
has assumed many forms ranging from military intervention, economic egoism
and internal political meddling to sincere, humanitarian efforts to provide
stable democratic government in an atmosphere of general economic prosperity.
President Roosevelt, in his inaugural address of 1933, announced the
Good Neighbor Policy with the avowed purpose of establishing a climate of
peace and prosperity between all nations. The policy was early interpreted
as an attempt to strengthen the bonds between the United States and Latin
America within a framework of friendship, mutual respect and hemispheric
solidarity. The Good Neighbor Policy marked a dramatic change in regard to
relations with Cuba and signalled the beginning of the end of interven-
tion as an instrument of United States foreign policy.
For the following 25 years, the Good Neighbor Policy formed the sub-
stance of the United State's relations with Cuba and all of Latin
America. Within Cuba, the dictator Batista maintained an atmosphere of
relative stability within which investments could prosper and he was
strongly supported by the United States. A great seething of unrest, how-
ever, lay just below the surface and after 3 years of civil war, Fidel
Castro emerged in 1959 as the new leader of Cuba. Subsequent anti-American
activities and membership in the Soviet bloc eventually led to the termina-
tion of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Thus, relations with
Cuba have come full circle—oppressed island ruled by a less than friendly
foreign power, war, protective custody and guidance by the United States,
civil war and finally, a government unfriendly to the United States whose
political ideology tends toward that of our cold war enemies.
3
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We shall, later in this paper, examine some of the events from 1898
to the present which have led to the current impasse. Specifically, we
will examine from a political, economic and strategic perspective the
major historical events which have had cause and effect relationships to
the formulation and application of United States policies toward Cuba.
Cuba, of course, is an integral part of the Caribbean and of Latin
America by virtue of geography and to some extent, language. To isolate
Cuba and its relations to the United States is admittedly somewhat arti-
ficial even though cultural, racial and political differences do exist.
Many policies applied to Cuba, however, such as armed intervention and
economic dominance have been employed in many other nations of Latin
America. Further, Cuba's history of unstable government, strong-man rule,
economic dependence on one crop and appalling inequality of wealth distri-
bution is not much different than many other nations all over the world.
Because so many parallels may be found between Cuba and other nations of
Latin America, it becomes practical and useful for ease of discussion to
isolate Cuba. This treatise, however, will where necessary, provide the
Caribbean and Latin America perspective required for a proper understanding
of American policies and goals.
There is yet another, more important reason for focusing our discus-
sions upon Cuba rather than the Caribbean or Latin American areas as a
whole. From the very outset, United States' policy toward Cuba was separate
and distinct from the policies applied to the remainder of Latin America.
Regardless of the many similarities which may be found with other nations,
Cuba has almost always received special consideration.
While the United States, in the early 19th century, advocated independ-
ence for other Latin American nations, it steadfastly supported Spanish rule
iii

over Cuba. At the same time, it pressured Spain to open the lucrative
4
Cuban ports to free trade. Opposition to Cuban independence was based
on two prime motives. First was the fear that an independent Cuba would
fall prey to a slave uprising as occurred in Haiti in 1804. The thought
of an independent black nation in close proximity to the slave holding
South and the possible social and economic effects was too unsettling to
be seriously considered. The second and even greater fear was that Great
Britain, which had large economic interests in the Caribbean, would
dominate or even occupy an independent Cuba. The United States had no
intention of allowing the Royal Navy a base just 90 miles from its shores
nor British development of the rich Cuban markets.
Cuba in the hands of a weak Spain was far more tolerable than racial
chaos or the presence of a powerful foreign nation. Thus, a paradox of
great importance in the history of United States-Latin American-Cuban
relations was formed. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 stated the United States'
opposition to any European powers making further attempts to colonize Latin
America or to reconquer former Spanish colonies which had revolted. On the
other hand, the Cuban policy of the United States supported the colonial
rule of Spain in order to preserve its commercial and strategic interests.
Cuban stability through preservation of the status quo was a far more
practical goal than philosophic consideration of extending the American
commitment to independence and freedom.
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The strategic location of Cuba was then, early recognized by
Americans as a possible threat and that realization, coupled with large
commercial interests, has dominated Cuban-American relations throughout
history. The missle crisis of 1962 brought the question of United States'
national security into vivid focus where it remains to this day.
We can now pose a second question to be discussed within the confines
of this paper: What threat does Castro pose to the United States and
what alternatives are available for dealing with him?

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1848 - President Polk attempts purchase of Cuba.
1854 - Ostend Manifesto.
1868 - Beginning of Ten Years War.
1873 - "Viginius" episode.
1878 - Treaty of Zanjon ending Ten Year's War.
1890 - McKinley Tariff.
1898 - Spanish-American War.
1902 - Cuban Republic established under terms of Piatt Amendment.
- Reciprocity Treaty.
1905 - Magoon appointed military governor by President Roosevelt-
Unites States Marines landed.
1909 - United States Marines landed to protect U.S. citizens.
1917 - United States Marines landed co restore tranquility under
President Menocal.
- President Wilson inaugurates "preventive policy."
1924 - Machado elected president.
1933 - President Roosevelt announces "Good Neighbor Policy."
1934 - Fulgencio Batista emerges as strong man of Cuban politics.
- Piatt Amendment abrogated.
- United States reduces tariff on Cuban sugar and establishes
sugar quota.
1940 - Batista elected president.
- Liberal constitution adopted.
1944 - Batista defeated by Grau San Martin.
1952 - Batista stages coup and returns to power.
1953 - Castro raids Moncado Barracks.
vi

1959 - Batista flees and Castro assumes power.
1960 - The United States and Cuba terminate diplomatic relations,
1961 - Bay of Pigs invasion.





Following the administration of President John Tyler, American sup-
port for continued Spanish rule of Cuba slowly eroded. Successful
Spanish efforts to restrict American trade were considered grossly un-
fair by a nation which was just beginning to flex its economic muscle
and considered free trade as one of the bulwarks of its foreign policy.
With the slavery issue gaining momentum in the United States, Southern
interests who previously feared a black nation in Cuba now began to see
the island as an important addition to the Union as a slave state. The
aggressive nature of "Manifest Destiny" was reaching its peak and after the
Pacific borders of the United States were secure, thoughts turned to serious
consideration of relieving Spain of the responsibility for Cuba.
James Polk in 1848, instructed the American Minister to Spain to com-
mence negotiations with a goal of purchasing Cuba for a sum of one hundred
million dollars. President Zachary Taylor withdrew this offer in order
to avert the possible addition of a slave state to the Union.
In 1854, as the slavery problem assumed ever greater importance, the
United States' ministers to Spain, France and England joined in the
"Ostend Manifesto." Their action, they felt, was required to maintain
slavery in the United States and thereby preserve the Union. The manifesto










A third effort to unseat the Spanish consisted of filibusters
(military expeditions) launched from the United States in support of rebel
Cuban factions. These filibusters were supported by Southern interests
who at best, wanted Cuba as a slave state and at least, wanted to prevent
the formation of a free black nation in such -close proximity. These
expeditions were generally poorly planned and ill equipped and were
dependent upon a general uprising of Cuban citizens for success. All
failed and as we know, history repeated itself at the Bay of Pigs many
9
years later.
The Civil War absorbed American energy for several years and the
national interest was focused on internal affairs rather than further
expansion. Public support for invasion or annexation lagged but there
existed in the South a hope that a slave society could be established in
Cuba. Lincoln's administration dashed this plan by announcing that such a
move would bring swift retaliation from the Union.
The first serious challenge to Spanish rule came in 1868 when Cuba
erupted in revolution led by Cuban Creoles. The Ten Years War commenced as
a challenge to tyrannical Spanish rule which subjected Cubans to excessive
taxation, denial of civil and religious liberties and withheld all opportu-
nity for Cubans to participate in their own government. The war soon
degenerated into a vicious, incredibly ferocious struggle which saw brutal
murder and pillage as a trait common to both sides.
9




ed. John Plank (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 8.
Langley, p. 54.

Effects of the war were soon felt in the United States as American
property was destroyed and American citizens were killed and injured.
American sympathies were with the insurgents not only because of their
struggle for freedom, which was similar to our own, but also because of
stories of inhuman Spanish atrocities which leaked out of Cuba. A Cuban
rebel government in exile in New York received arms and money from
sympathizers and arranged for them to be smuggled to Cuba aboard American
vessels. In October 1873, one of these ships, the Virginius was captured
by the Spanish and several members of the crew and passengers were sum-
marily executed. Many Americans called for war but the Grant administration
insisted on a policy of non-intervention. A compromise was reached and Spain
apologized and paid indemnities.
As the war continued, American trade and investments suffered. The
United States, attempting to remain neutral in the struggle, refused to
officially recognize the rebels or their cause but did propose several
plans to Spain in hopes of restoring peace. An offer to purchase Cuba was
rejected by Spain as were pleas for reforms in colonial rule or mediation
of the dispute by the United States. Spain insisted that no negotiations
of any sort could be held until a Spanish military victory had been
achieved.
By 1876, the rebel forces had been reduced to small disorganized
bands which no longer posed even a minimal threat to Spanish rule. In
January of 1878 the rebel leaders surrendered and in the Treaty of Zanjon
agreed to the sovereignty of Spain in return for Spanish guarantee of
12political and administrative reform.




The years 1878-1898 brought greatly increased involvement of American
capital into Cuba. Within a few years, American trade with Cuba was
greater than the combined trade of the rest of Latin America with the
United States. The destructiveness of the Ten Years War bankrupted many
Spanish and Cuban plantation owners and American investors and speculators
13
were eager to buy up the land. Carnegie Steel, American Sugar Refinery
Company and Standard Oil were among the many United States' concerns which
gathered large holdings in Cuba. By 1896, United States investments in
sugar and mining properties totaled fifty million dollars and American
14
exports to Cuba were valued at $105,000,000. It has been estimated that
Cuban trade made up almost one fourth of the United States' entire world
trade during this period.
The spirit of Manifest Destiny was still alive in America although it
had lain dormant for several years following the Civil War. A new genera-
tion of expansionists comprising such figures as Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge began to see the United
States as not only a continental power but as a world power with an empire
equal to those held by the imperial powers of Europe. Mahan argued that
the nation's strength rested upon a strong commercial and industrial base
which could operate in international markets through a system of strategically
positioned colonies. This far flung mercantile system was to be protected







Smith, What Happened in Cuba ? p. 87.
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shores into the Caribbean, the Pacific Ocean and the vast markets of
Asia.
Cuba, to this group of men, took on vital international significance.
Not only did the island provide a rich trade in sugar and tobacco in
exchange for manufactured goods, but by its location, it dominated the
Caribbean, and the future site of an isthmian canal. From Cuban ports,
United States ships could trade with all of Latin America and through
the canal into the entire Pacific. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge wrote
" In the interests of our commerce we should build
the Nicaragua Canal and for the protection of that canal
and for the sake of our commercial supremacy in the Pacific,
we should control the Hawaiian Islands and maintain our
influence in Samoa. England has studded the West Indies with
strong places which are a standing menace to our Atlantic sea-
board. We should have among those islands, at least one
strong naval station, and when the Nicaragua Canal is built,
the island of Cuba will become a necessity . "1'
A severe recession in the early 1890' s created stagnation of the
economy and lent credence to claims that only through empire could
economic security be maintained. Businessmen faced with problems of
over production joined the clamor for a foreign policy which would
ensure energetic action to open new markets and powerful protection for
existing ones.
Cuba, meanwhile, continued to suffer under Spanish rule which has
changed little since the promise of Zanjon. Slavery was abolished in 1886
Langley, p. 101.
Morison and Commager, p. 323.

but few other political or civil reforms were instituted. Cuban exiles
in the United States had never accepted Spanish rule in whatever guise
and continued to plot for an independent Cuba.
In 1895, Cuba suffered a severe economic setback as the bottom fell
out of the sugar market. This was caused by a complex set of tariff laws
enacted by both Spain and the United States. The McKinley Tariff passed in
1890 abolished the tariff on Cuban sugar but raised duties on tobacco. This
action dealt the tobacco industry a heavy blow and encouraged further ex-
pansion of sugar plantations. Between 1890 and 1894, sugar production in-
creased 400,000 tons per year. In order to protect American sugar interests
during the depression, the Wilson Tariff in 1895 placed a tax of 40 percent




Within this atmosphere of political oppression and economic disaster,
Cuban rebels under the leadership of Jose Marti launched their second
attempt to overthrow Spain and gain independence. The war quickly became
unbelievably savage with many atrocities committed on each side. The
Spanish Governor, General Weyler became known in the press as "the Butcher."
The United States quickly became involved in the Cuban revolution.
With a Cuban exile government again established in New York and military
expeditions again setting out from American ports, neutrality became difficult
to enforce. Individual American citizens and large businesses operating in
Cuba demanded armed intervention to protect their properties and investments.
Cuban nationals holding American citizenship likewise claimed protection of




Within the United States, feelings were divided over Cuba. Many
Americans were sympathetic to the suffering of the Cuban people and sup-
ported some form of United States support. A small but vocal group
headed by Senator Orville H. Piatt opposed any type of intervention.
Senator Piatt was convinced that U.S. meddling would lead to war. The
senator further feared an independent Cuba would be incapable of ruling
itself and would lapse into anarchy and continued strife and bloodshed.
The business community was also divided. Some favored immediate,
vigorous action while others wanted only peace and stability to be
reinstated as quickly as possible. At the time, continued Spanish rule
seemed the fastest means to this end.
The expansionists saw their opportunity to advance their interests
and called for an aggressive policy in order to advance American economic
and strategic interests. They were not particularly interested in annexing
or otherwise ruling Cuba but wanted Spain out of the Caribbean so that
America could dominate the area and control trade and the southern approaches
to the United States.
The Cleveland administration preferred not to intervene and encouraged
Spain to grant meaningful reforms. Spain, at first, ignored these requests
but finally in 1897 authorized a relaxation of some of its previous policies.
The Cuban revolutionists were no longer satisfied by half-way measures and
continued the war with their only goal as independence.
President McKinley came into office in 1897 on a platform calling for
Cuban independence. McKinley moved slowly, however, and again appealed to
Spain to provide a peaceful and proper solution. Next followed a series
of events which destroyed any hope for a peaceful settlement and sent war

8fever In the United States to a fever pitch. The New York Journal printed
a private letter written by the Spanish Minister which was extremely
critical of and insulting to President McKinley. This was followed shortly
by the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana Harbor with a heavy loss of
life.
The popular press of the day printed these stories in great detail
and made repeated demands for war as the only way to salve the nation's
pride. Congress caught the war fever and clamored for war. Spain, by now
fearful of a war with the United States, informed the U.S. minister
that hostilities would cease. McKinley, however, concerned with maintaining
leadership sent a war message to Congress. To the Joint Resolution authorizing
the use of armed forces, Congress added the Teller Amendment which disclaimed
19
any imperialistic designs on Cuba.
The "splendid little war" was enthusiastically prosecuted by Americans
against superior but poorly trained and equipped Spanish forces. Within
less than nine months, the war ended and the United States found itself the
possessor of an empire. The battlefield glories rapidly faded with the




The Treaty of Paris concluded the war in December, 1898 and gave the
United States the Phillipine Islands, Guam, Puerto Rico and the right to
20
occupy Cuba for an indefinite period.
The treaty ending the war transferred the obligation to govern and
protect life and property from Spain to the United States. No mention was
made of Cuban independence nor in fact, was a Cuban representative invited
21
to sign the document. The only legal basis upon which the United States
established an occupation government, aside from the treaty with Spain, was
the law of conquest, not consent of the Cuban people.
The United States set up a military government which faced the
herculean task of bringing order out of the chaos left by Spain. Poverty,
disease and illiteracy were rampant. The Cuban treasury was $500 million
in debt and could not pay for the most rudimentary services. Cubans with
little experience in government often appeared bewildered and generally
incompetent at effective organization. The military exercised autocratic
and summary methods to make improvements. Sanitation laws were strictly
enforced, courts and government departments were organized and established
22by decree, roads, schools and hospitals were rehabilitated. The ills of
of centuries were subjected to overnight cures. Many Cubans began to chafe











The military government had been established as a means of providing
a transition from colonial despotism to some form of self government for
Cuba. The Teller Amendment while not specifically saying so, alluded
that a Cuban republic would be established. Many Americans, including
the military, had little hope that Cubans could govern themselves. This
group felt annexation to be the only lasting answer and ingenious methods
to circumvent the Teller Amendment were developed. Opponents of annexation
argued the Teller Amendment had to be honored. Mahan, Roosevelt and others
decried large scale annexation of colonies, but supported a plan to develop
strategic naval bases and spheres of political and economic influence.
The result of these debates was the Piatt Amendment developed by
Senator Piatt and Secretary of War Elihu Root. Root was especially con-
cerned, in light of the Boxer Rebellion in China, that Cuba's government
be stable and capable of protecting foreign lives and property. Inherent
in the amendment was the belief that Cuba would not be able to achieve this
goal without American guidance.
The Piatt Amendment contained five salient features:
1. Cuba was not to sign any treaty which might impair her independence or
grant special concessions to foreign powers without United States' permis-
sion.
2. The Cuban debt was to be maintained at a low level.
3. The United States would be permitted to intervene in Cuban affairs to
protect independence and maintain stability.
4. Acts of the U.S. military government were to be ratified.
5. Sites for naval bases were to be sold or leased to the United States.
23
The Piatt Amendment, 1902, U.S. Statutes at Large , XVI, pp. 897-898.
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The Cuban consltutional convention rejected the intervention pro-
posal and refused to incorporate it within the constitution. Root
replied that U.S. rule would continue until such a guarantee were in-
cluded but softened the blow by asserting that intervention would occur
only in the event of foreign attack or in the event of anarchy. These
qualifying statements were never incorporated into either Cuban or
United States' laws thereby providing subsequent United States' admini-
strations with a wide latitude of interpretation.
The Cubans were mollified, the Piatt Amendment incorporated in the
Cuban Constitution, elections held, and in 1902 President Tomas Estrada
Palma took office and the American military occupation closed. Cuban
independence was at last a reality albeit with some very strong strings
attached. Perhaps the most important fact here is not that the United
States maintained supervision over Cuban affairs but that independence
was granted so quickly or even at all. At a time when imperialist expan-
sion was endorsed and actively promoted by all major nations the United
States, at least in part, placed freedom and self determination for Cuba
ahead of empire. Whether such action was wise is an open question.
It is of interest at this point to note that United States' behavior
toward each of its new possessions was different in each case. Guam was
governed essentially as a military colony to provide a base for cable com-
munications and naval operations in the Pacific. The Phillippine Islands,
after the bloody insurrection which followed the American takeover, became
a monument to American good works and good will and a model for colonial
. . 25
admxmstration. The Hawaiian Islands, which were annexed during the war,
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were administered in a manner designed to prepare them for eventual state-
hood. Finally, Puerto Rico was governed by a unique arrangement by which
the United States acting in concert with local leadership did away with
colonial trappings and at the same time prevented rampant nationalism.
Generally speaking, these policies were successful and today these
former colonies are relatively content with their political relationship
to the United States. Only Cuba can be counted as a dismal failure and
one cannot help but wonder if a different approach to Cuba would have
brought different results. I shall not attempt to examine this question in
the detail it deserves but will suggest only that the successful trans-
planting of democratic political institutions and their underlying
philosophies require a great deal of time, patience and above all, mutual
consent and cooperation. The United States gave to Cuba the form of
democratic government but did not nurture the spirit. By seeing the Teller
Amendment as a call for swift action, the United States gave independence
to Cuba long before the new nation had assimilated the proper political and
administrative skills.
In a larger sense the real question here is how does a modern, indus-
trial nation which has major responsibility for a colony whose social,
political and educational institutions do not measure up to self-government
foster and develop self government? A very difficult question and even a
cursory reading of the literature encompassing political administrative
development will show there are precious few answers. Cultural, ethnic,
social, economic and political factors all intertwine to form a complex web
which serves to impede the assimilation of a foreign value system by a
colony. The task is not impossible, of course; witness Puerto Rico, the
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Phillipines or certain former British colonies. It would appear that
various elements must be present to successfully develop an emerging
nation. First among these vital factors must be the consent of the
governed to establish and accept the political system in question.
Second, mature, honest and vigorous political and administrative
machinery must either be present or painstakingly developed. Finally,
there must exist an atmosphere of close cooperation and rapport between
the colony and the colonial power. On the social and economic levels there
must not be condescension or financial pillage but instead there must be
a sense of equal partnership toward a common goal. Returning now to the
Cuban story, we shall see that the United States made little headway in
promoting any of these necessary ingredients for colonial success.
For the three decades following Cuban independence, the United States
maintained close supervision over not only Cuba but the entire Caribbean.
By establishing a comprehensive system of protectorates throughout the
Caribbean the United States hoped to maintain its own security by denying
an opportunity for European interference in Latin America. The assumption
that trade and prosperity followed stability enhanced this policy. Employing
economic and political pressure and occasionally military force, the United
States kept peace in the Caribbean. Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic experienced intervention and at one time or another were
American protectorates. It should be noted that in most cases when the
Unites States intervened it was exercising a privilege granted by a formal
27
agreement or complying with a request for aid by a Caribbean government.
For a fuller development of these concepts see Brewster C. Denny, "The
Unites States and Puerto Rico: A Century of Success 1898-2000," Howard
Law Journal
, vol. 15 (Fall, 1968), pp. 70-87.
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Intervention implies that a settlement between two factions cannot be
resolved and therefore action of a third party is required. Someone then
has to lose and the loser is not apt to feel friendship toward the out-
sider who caused his failure. By each act of intervention in Latin
America, the United States regardless of its motives, developed a large
bloc of anti-American sentiment.
Within Cuba, however, the problem was even more sensitive. Inter-
vention in Cuba would be damned for its own sake but also because the
United States appeared to be reneging on the spirit of 1898. The Teller
Amendment committed the United States to the establishment of a free and
independent Cuba; The Piatt Amendment conversely not only weakened the
1898 pledge but was a statement of blatant colonialism.
From the American point of view, it could be argued the amendment was
necessary to protect a small, weak nation lacking essential political skills,
located in a strategic position and producing a crop valuable to many nations
The other side of the coin, however, shows over protection and smothering
paternalism leads to dependence and retards development. What to Americans
appeared as generous and friendly help was seen by Cubans as forced denial
of their right to self government.
Cuban politicians while, almost to a man, loudly opposing American
intervention, soon learned to use it to their advantage. By cautious refer-
ence to possible intervention they were often able to manipulate events to
their liking. The United States was often portrayed as the villian in order
28
to attain political advantage.
It was not long after its establishment that the Cuban republic ran






to a second term. The opposition parties refused to recognize the
election for several complex political reasons and rebelled. President
Theodore Roosevelt promptly sent William Howard Taft, Secretary of War,
to mediate. Negotiations were not successful and Palma resigned along
with his entire cabinet. Roosevelt appointed Charles Magoon to act as
military governor. He was backed by 7,600 United States Marines. Magoon
attempted reorganization of the Cuban government to make it more capable
of solving Cuba's many problems. His administration, however, was marked by
29
political patronage for his supporters and corrupt profiteering. Future
Cubans would view Magoon with contempt and blame him and the United States
for the tradition of corrupt politics in Cuba.
The government was returned to the Cubans in 1909 with the election of
Jose Miguel Gomez. Shortly thereafter, a negro revolt broke out and though
it was quickly squelched, United States Marines were again landed to protect
American citizens.
In 1917, The Liberal Party disputed the election of President Mario
Menocal after he had previously promised not to seek re-election. Charging
corruption and unfair voting procedures the Liberals requested United States
intervention and threatened open revolt. The United States, wishing to
neutralize possible German use of Cuba to spy on American ship movements was
vitally interested in maintaining Cuban cooperation. Menocal, moved swiftly
to counter the Liberal's revolt and then appealed to the United States for
intervention on the basis of supporting a government which protected American
lives and property. The United States responded by landing 2,600 Marines
which ensured Menocal' s tenure in office. Menocal in turn, allowed agents
29
Kalman H. Silvert, "A Hemispheric Perspective," in Cuba and the United
States
, ed. John Plank, p. 129.

16
of the Departments of War, Justice and Navy to operate in Cuba in order
30
to apprehend German agents. Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels,
who is remembered in the United States Navy for other reasons, wrote in
his diary that American power had put Menocal back in office when he had
31
been rejected at the polls.
Weary of Cuban election disputes and philosophically opposed to armed
intervention, President Wilson upon completion of World War I, sent Enoch
Crowder to Cuba to supervise the establishment of a democratic, legal and
workable election procedure. This move ended military intervention and
initiated the "preventive policy" which was designed to negate the need for
32
armed force to maintain Cuban tranquility. Crowder installed an election
system modeled after that of the United States but President Menocal quickly
found loopholes which allowed him to suppress his enemies and remain in
power.
In 1921, Crowder returned to Cuba as personal representative of the
president and all but arranged the election of Alfredo Zayas as president.
Crowder remained in Cuba as United States Ambassador and used every opportu-
nity to lecture the new president on the need for responsible government.
Regardless of Wilson's and Crowder's attempts, Cuban politics continued
to be venal, corrupt and fraudulent. Gerado Machado's election in 192A
appeared, however, to reflect some of Crowder's efforts at reform. Unlike
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were minimal. Machado campaigned on an anti-American platform which
attacked the Piatt Amendment and expressed resentment toward the United
States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay. Machado quickly took firm hold
of the government and for -the moment he appeared to be the strong, benevo-
lent ruler so badly needed in Cuba. Because Machado provided stability
and therefore protection to American investments, his anti-American state-
ments caused no real concern in the United States. Machado was a stock-
holder in several American firms and this knoweldge gave security to United
States businessmen. Machado 's consolidation of power met with political
opposition and this he crushed by brutal means. Secret police, assassina-
tions, torture and terror were employed by Machado to retain control. Be-
tween 1930 and 1933, student riots, bombings and political assassinations
33
threw Cuba into complete discord.
Since 1917, the United States had refrained from armed intervention in
favor of diplomatic and economic pressures in dealing with Latin America.
Wilson's "Preventive Policy" and a revival of Secretary Root's interpretation
of the Piatt Amendment committed the United States to non-interference. On
the other hand, it appeared that only firm external force could maintain
political stability in Cuba. Caught in this dilemma, the State Department
took little action against Machado except to advise he moderate his methods.
To oppressed Cubans who were hoping for intervention, this inaction was con-
sidered to be tacit approval of Machado by the United States.
Recently elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his inaugural
address of 1933 briefly mentioned that America's foreign policy would






the herald of a dramatically new policy toward Cuba and all of Latin
America. The Good Neighbor Policy was in effect, a public admission that
intervention had not proved a successful means to maintaining peace and
political stability in the Western Hemisphere. The policy became an overt
attempt by the United States to regain respect, trust and friendship in
Latin America.
The continuing turmoil and discord in Cuba became the first test for
Roosevelt and his new policy. The strategic and especially commercial
value of Cuba during the world depresssion was not lost on Roosevelt and he
placed the value of a settlement in Cuba above any idealism regarding
absolute non-intervention.
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles was sent to Cuba as Ambassador
with instructions to negotiate a commercial treaty which would bolster the
Cuban economy and offer United States' mediation between the warring
political factions. Welles at first, supported Machado as the only hope
to regain order but became disenchanted when Machado refused to liberalize his
regime. Welles decided that only Machado f s departure would bring an end to
the general chaos. With the weight of the United States behind him, Welles
informed the dictator he must step down. Machado refused but as strikes
and demonstrations continued unabated and having used the last of his
political resources, he at last fled the country.
A coalition government was formed by Dr. Carlos de Cespedes but was
unable to overcome opposition from various factions and soon collapsed.
Welles requested United States troops be landed but Roosevelt declined on
the grounds that any United States' support would appear to be approval of
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that government by Washington.
Grau San Martin next formed a government, but like his predecessors,
could not unite the nation. Grau appealed to the United States for
recognition but this was withheld on Welles' recommendation. Finally, in
1934, Juan Fulgencio Batista surfaced as the man most likely to placate the
various political groups and bring strong, stable government to Cuba.
Welles informed Batista that the United States had no partiality in
the contest for power but would welcome any government which could establish
order and safeguard life and property. Following this statement, Batista
backed by the army, compelled Grau to resign- Carlos Mendieta was installed
as President with Batista's blessing and within five days, the United States
recognized the Cuban government. Batistia would dominate the Cuban scene
for the next 25 years whether in office or out. Years later, lack of United
States' intervention would be credited with paving the way for Batistas'
dictatorship.
With a viable government finally in control, the Roosevelt administra-
tion began to dismantle the old interventionist policy. In May, 1934, came
a new treaty which abolished the Piatt Amendment. The only legacy from the
37days of empire was an agreement to continue the naval base at Guantanamo.
Intervention and the Piatt Amendment are blamed for many contemporary
problems the United States now faces in Latin America. Several opinions
exist which seek to explain why the United States followed such a policy of
interference in another nation's internal affairs. One argument holds that
the American government sought to insure easy access for private capital
into the island, another explanation stresses the vital necessity of protect-






foothold in the weak republics of the Caribbean.
The historian and Latin American expert Dana G. Munro, suggests that
although many unwise decisions were made, the United States' policies were
grounded in a sincere and honest desire to promote political and economic
conditions that would prevent discord and anarchy and thus protect America's
interests. He notes that with the exception of Cuba, little American money
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followed the flag into the "banana republics."
For a nation to interfere in another's affairs presupposes three import-
ant points. The first being that the intervenor has the necessary power to
make its desires obeyed. The second is the assumption that might makes right
and the intervening nation has superior knowledge and ability lacking in
its victim. Third, the intervenor feels it knows what is right for the
other. By being big enough to impose its will, the United States rationalized
that it knew better than Cuba or other Caribbean nations what was best for
them.
Power, of course, cannot stifle resentment and anger, and will most likely
foster them. Nations of the Caribbean, as they shook off the years of Spanish
colonialism and began to develop national identities, bitterly denounced the
United States for not allowing them to gain political maturity according to
their own precepts.
The Piatt Amendment may have been conceived as an altruistic device to
aid and protect an impoverished and inexperienced Cuba. The amendment may
also have been necessary to protect the national security of the United States
in 1903. Regardless of its virtues, however, it soon became a hated symbol
of American paternalism and a yoke about the necks of both Cuba and the United
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States. Assuming the amendment was required, it would have been an easier
pill to swallow had a time limit been established. Cubans would then have
known when their "tutelage" would end. Perhaps, rather than relying on
American help when things went awry, the Cubans would have made more serious,
honest attempts to establish governmental institutions responsive to the
nation's needs.
By abrogation of the Piatt Amendment the United States gained a great
deal of good will in Latin America. Roosevelt would become more highly
esteemed than any other American in the Southern Hemisphere due to his policy




The political record is only a part of Cuba's history. Intertwined
with the political turmoil is a long, complex story of commercial and
economic events. Parallel to the rise of intervention was the economic
involvement of United States capital in Cuba. In 1910, the American
Minister in Cuba wrote
"Americans generally are not liked in Cuba because most of
those who come here (tourists excepted) wish to make money
and to develop the country on American lines... "3°
The search for Cuban markets constituted an important part of American
policy in the nineteenth century. Businessmen and farmers cursed the stifling
Spanish regulations which prevented the importation of American goods into
Cuba. Investors sought to speculate in the sugar industry and policy makers
stressed the value of free trade between Cuba and the United States as a
means to economic and political maturity. Just prior to the war of 1898,
Spanish mercantile policies were bitterly attacked and blamed for the poverty
and backwardness of the island. Cuba was considered to be a rich treasure
chest which could only be opened by wise use of American capital. James
Boyce in 1902, observed
"No better field for the expenditure of capital could be wished
for. Under a wise and firm government and in the hands of an
energetic race, it might attain to a very high measure of
prosperity. "^
Upon assuming responsibility for Cuba's political direction, the United
States also found itself faced with the task of shoring up the island's
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industry lay in shambles. Possessing no large, salable crop, the nation
faced bankruptcy. A reciprocal trade treaty in 1902 reduced the United
States' tariff on Cuban sugar and in return, American goods received like
consideration in Cuba. The treaty was vigorously opposed by United States'
beet sugar interests but President Roosevelt gave his full support and
41
after a year of debate the treaty was ratified.
Assured of a market, the Cuban sugar industry recovered and by 1911,
the United States imported almost all its sugar from Cuba. Sugar produc-
tion by World War I reached a point where the United States could no longer
consume it all and the surplus caused a search for other markets. The war
created an increased demand for sugar and Cuba further enlarged sugar produc-
tion. When the war ended, the bubble burst and Cuba again faced disaster as
the price of sugar fell. American firms such as Hershey Chocolate Company,
Hires Root Beer, Loft Candy and American Refinery Company expanded their
ownership of Cuban sugar refineries and plantations and soon dominated the
industry. *
American businessmen swarmed to the island and penetrated into all facets
of the economy. American investments increased from $220,000,000 in 1913 to
$1,590,000 in 1929. American owned sugar mills produced 48.4 percent of the
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crop in 1920 and by 1928, Americans controlled 70-75 percent of the industry.
Other enterprises also attracted American capital. International Tele-
phone and Telegraph controlled the Cuban Telephone Company. The main rail-
roads were in American hands and monopolized transportation of American imports
41











Large American banks did a brisk business in commercial loans and greatly
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influenced the flow of capital.
The American entrepeneurs formed powerful economic interest groups which
greatly favored "gunboat" diplomacy as a means of ensuring peace and stability
in Cuba and all of Latin America. These businessmen firmly believed that
American business activity in Latin America was of vital concern to the
prosperity of the United States. These concepts had great influence on
American thinking and contributed to the formulation of American foreign
policy. Businessmen not only embraced these views as a philosophical argument
but also made every effort to make them known to the United States' government.
It was not until 1934 that Congress consented to renegotiation of the
trade treaty. Until that time, Cuban trade was dependent upon the vagaries
of the world sugar market and the American economic scene. Bankruptcy became
a common event in Cuba and American capital began to retreat. By 1933, United
States' imports of Cuban goods dropped by 20 percent from a high of 83.3 per-
cent in 1924. After 1929, Cuban sugar exports to the United States dropped
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sharply both in value and quantity.
Franklin Roosevelt had a vested interest in getting the Cuban economy
back on its feet. The 1902 Reciprocity Treaty was to economic colonialism
what the Piatt Amendment had been to the political scene. Also with the
depression, Roosevelt was obliged to find means by which the American economy
could be stimulated. Many business and manufacturing groups laid great stress
on the importance of foreign trade as the keystone to recovery. Cuba appeared
as a ready made opportunity to expand United States' foreign trade and










The commercial treaty of 1934 not only reduced the tariff on Cuban
sugar but also established a quota system. By this device it was hoped
Cuban dependence on the United States would be lessened and a stimulus
to search out new markets would be provided. In return, Cuba was to
lower tariffs on many American goods and reduce internal taxes on American
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products.
A further step to enhance Cuban-American relations was establishment of
the Second Import-Export Bank. The purpose of the bank was two-fold: One
was to provide assistance to the Cuban government to overcome its financial
crises and the other to enable American exporters to acquire long terra
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loans and thereby stimulate foreign trade. American and Cuban business
interests were generally happy with the New Deal's political and economic
solutions. American exports to Cuba began to increase steadily and the total
value of these imports rose from $22.7 million in 1933 to $147.1 million in
1945. By 1950, the United States provided 80.7 percent of all Cuban imports
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and in turn, purchased 69 percent of Cuba's exports.
Cuba also prospered and began some diversification of industry. Leather,
shoes, textiles, fibers and paper were manufactured. Other products were
fertilizer, cement, flour and cattle feed. The cattle, sheep and poultry














On the surface at least, Cuba became a happy, prosperous nation with
great potential for developing into a modern, industrial nation. Hidden
from view, however, were social and economic problems which had caused un-
rest before and would again when they surfaced in 1959.
One of the more glaring problems was the extreme poverty of the masses.
In 1945, 7.9 percent of the "farms" occupied 71.1 percent of the land. Con-
versly, 69.6 percent of the farms occupied only 11.2 percent of all the farm
land. Over 200,000 families were reported to own no land at all and these
workers rarely worked more than three months a year. The majority of Cubans
lived in poverty in a rich land where only a small minority owned the wealth.
Of this minority, many were Americans and Cubans recognized this fact. Many
Cubans felt their country had become once again, a colony of the United
States and they began to harbor anti-American sentiment.
Batista in the 1930' s, played the roll of "king maker." Presidents came
and went at the pleasure of Batista. He remained head of the "revolution" and
supreme chief of the armed forces. Presenting himself as a champion of
political orderliness and socio-economic reforms, Batista sponsored child
labor laws, a minimum wage, eight hour work days, paid vacations and the
right to strike. The Constitution of 1940, enacted after Batista became
president, gave further promise of social and economic reform. The minimum
wage law was expanded, social security extended to more people and the
principle of equal pay for equal work adopted. There were also provisions
52for limiting foreign ownership of land and vague reference to land reform.
Smith, The United States and Cuba
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Batista' presence was recognized as a force for political stability
by the United States. Although some of the nationalistic and reformist
ideals he espoused were worrisome to United States' investors, it soon be-
came clear that talk of land reform or expropriation of foreign holdings
was meant only for local consumption. The Roosevelt administration also
promised to withdraw economic aid should American investments not be
properly protected.
Batista left office in 1944 after losing the election to Grau San Martin
in an upset. Grau and his predecessor Prio Socarras were not, however, able
to establish effective government. Every plan seemed to fail.
In 1952, Batista staged a bloodless coup and regained the presidential
palace. His return to power was generally welcomed as he was equated with
political stability, prosperity and protection. American capital continued
to dominate the scene although United States' ownership of the sugar industry
did decrease to approximately 33 percent.
Cuba appeared as the realization of all the promise and benefits of
capitalism. The nation was politically stable and offered protection to
foreign investments in an expanding market. Tourism flourished and Havana
night life became world famous. A Department of Commerce bulletin praised
the harbors, highways and railroads and other industrial developments of
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Beneath this glittering facade was a dissatisfied revolutionary move-
ment that would disavow the Cuban-American relationship and seek political
and social reformation. This force would be led by Fidel Castro.
Phillip W. Bonsai, "Cuba, Castro and the United States," Foreign Affairs ,




Castro began his revolutionary career in 1953 with an ill planned raid
on the Moncada army barracks. The scheme called for taking the post and
winning popular acclaim and support to unseat Batista. The raid failed and
Castro was imprisoned. During his trial, he made his famous "History Will
Absolve Me" speech in which he recounted the poverty and servitude of the
Cuban people and the graft and corruption of the Batista government. He
condemned Batista for ignoring the reform provisions of the 1940 Constitu-
tion and promised to inaugurate land reform and profit sharing for sugar
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workers and to confiscate illegal land holdings.
In 1954, Batista, feeling his control of Cuba was complete and wishing
to demonstrate that Cuba was democratic, decided to grant amnesty to political
prisoners. Castro and his followers were freed and departed for Mexico.
Castro returned in 1956 leading a small invasion force into Oriente Province.
Batista's troops soon routed the invaders and only Castro and eleven of his
men found santuary in the Sierra Maestras.
Castro carried out an effective, relentless guerilla campaign. Com-
munication lines were cut, cane fields burned and government buildings bombed.
Batista decided Castro was a threat and went so far as to proclaim him dead.
Herbert L. Matthews of the New York Times disproved this by interviewing
Castro in the Sierra Maestras. Batista now began ruthless measures to
defeat the rebels. Stories of murder and mutilation committed by Batista's
police became common and international sympathy for the guerrillas began to
swell.
Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me (New York, 1961), pp. 33-39.
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The United States found itself embarrassed as it became obvious
the millions of dollars of military aid given Batista were not being used
for hemispheric defense but instead were employed against the guerrillas.
In many quarters, this was considered as United States' approval of
Batista's regime.
An arms embargo was declared by the United States and the U.S.
Ambassador was instructed to express complete neutrality. Wary of Castro
and repelled by Batista's excesses, the State Department sent a secret
emissary, William D. Pawley, to Cuba. His instructions were to attempt to
convince Batista to resign and in his place appoint a junta of military
officers who were opposed to both Batista and Castro. The plan failed, how-
ever, because Pawley was not authorized to promise the full support of the
the United States government.
Castro's movement gained momentum and received strong support from the
middle class who had by now lost faith with Batista because of the graft and
intolerance of the dictator. On January 1, 1959, Castro triumphantly
entered Havana and Batista fled the country.
The United States promptly recognized the new government and prepared to
do business as usual. As time progressed, however, it became apparent that
this revolution was more than a typical garden variety rebellion staged by
political malcontents. The Castro regime proclaimed instead, a social
revolution and took immediate steps to implement widesweeping reforms.
During 1959, ten hospitals were built, hundreds of miles of roads con-
structed, thousands of low cost houses built and numerous schools erected.
Earl T. Smith, The Fourth Floor (New York, 1962), pp. 20, 166-167.
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Graft and corruption in government was routed out and a crackdown on
58
gambling and crime in the major cities was commenced.
The more controversial acts of the Cuban government were its policies in
regard to business and agrarian reforms. American businessmen were wary of
Castro but many hoped he would make nationalistic and reformist statements,
much like his predecessor, and when after his power was consolidated, revert
to a more cordial and cooperative government. By June 1959, however, it was
evident that Castro intended to reduce drastically economic dependence on
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the United States and that sweeping land reforms were coming.
In April of 1959, Castro journeyed to the United States. His exact
reasons are not clear but there is some evidence he came seeking a loan after
having been turned down by the International Monetary Fund. Possibly he
hoped for the Eisenhower administration to offer economic aid. In this way
he could have his money yet not appear to be a petitioner subservient to the
United States.
President Eisenhower was deeply suspicious of Castro's politics and
refused to meet him for fear such a meeting would infer United States' approval
of a government which many felt had very close ties to international com-
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munism. Thus rebuked, Castro nevertheless appeared before a select committee
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of the United States Congress and attempted to explain the goals and
purposes of the revolution. He received little meaningful support or
sympathy. It would appear now with the passage of time and in light of
past events that this trip was the last opportunity for the United
States and Cuba to establish some form of rapport and maintain friendly
although perhaps strained relations.
The next several months saw Castro's popularity and reputation as a
democratic leader of an oppressed people fade. Showcase trials of
Batista's henchmen complete with jeering throngs in an atmosphere of mast-
head justice disgusted Americans who were more accustomed to the orderli-
ness of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. New Cuban laws nationalizing foreign
owned businesses compounded United States' distrust of Castro and confirmed
the worst fears that Cuba was taking an anti-American stance in the Cold
War.
Cuban-American relations deteriorated rapidly from this point on.
The United States government protested the expropriations on the grounds
the nationalization laws violated international law. Castro replied by
taking another $5 million worth of American owned land.
Castro next struck a bargain with Moscow. The agreement to purchase
Cuban sugar appeared to be the solution to Cuba's sagging economy but the
Russians insisted payment would be primarily in trade rather than hard cash
and the agreed price was lower than what the United States paid. This deal
was received with outrage in the United States but to many Latin Americans
it appeared as a sincere effort to seek new markets and end economic dependence
on the United States.
f>7
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American owned oil companies were next seized by Castro when they
refused (after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury) to process
Soviet oil. President Eisenhower retaliated by suspending the Cuban sugar
quota. Castro served the United States another defeat by expropriating
64
the American sugar mills.
Tit-for-tat diplomacy finally ended in early January 1960 when Castro
ordered the United States embassy to reduce its size to eleven persons.
Shortly thereafter, President Eisenhower announced the termination of
JJS . . , . 65diplomatic relations.
One final event remained to complete the humiliation of the United
States and underscore its failure to successfully pursue its own interests
in the Caribbean. Ambassador Phillip W. Bonsai writes
In April 1961, 1500 brave Cubans, selected, equipped,
trained, financed, transported, misled and eventually
(the survivors) ransomed by us, landed at the Bay of Pigs
as the major element in an enterprise to free their
7,000,000 compatriots from Castro's military and security
apparatus of something over 100,000 comparatively well
prepared men and women. That fiasco, in conjunction with
our replacement by Soviet Russia as Cuba's major economic
partner consolidated Castro's position. After the Bay of
Pigs, the regime became so strong internally that even the
missile crisis of October 1962, revealing as it did, the
true relative dimensions of the partners in the Castro-
Khruschev dialogue, failed to shake it. 66
Thus was Cuba lost from the sphere of American influence. William
Appleman Williams states unequivocally that no true understanding of recent
Cuban-American relations is possible unless we accept the fact "that Cuba









contributed to its own downfall is open to argument it is nonetheless,
difficult to argue that Cuba was not, in fact, an American colony from
1895 to 1959. The Piatt Amendment and the Reciprocal Trade Treaty of
1902 are fact and regardless of their good intentions, the United States
did interfere in the activities of a supposedly sovereign nation. If
American policies had no greater overall effect than the generation of
deep resentment toward the United States, then the United States must
share a certain part of the guilt for the tragedy of Cuba. By performing
in such a manner so as to leave its motives open to question, the United
States allowed itself to become Castro's whipping boy. Castro had but to
revive all the old cliches of political and economic colonialism and point
to past military intervention in order to rally the Cuban people to his
cause.
The fact that Castro has joined the Communist movement or that he has
established a totalitarian government in violation of his promise to restore
the Constitution of 1940 and hold free elections does not absolve United
States' behavior. Had United States' policy during 61 years of stewardship
recognized the gross social, economic and political inequalities and made
some honest effort at reform, perhaps Fidel Castro would not have had an
opportunity to build his repugnant regime at our very doorstep. We must
not, however, believe that if United States policies had been different there
would be no present problem in Cuba. To believe so assumes omnipotence on
the part of the United States. This of course, is absurd because for all
our virtuosness and power we cannot change a national psyche. If the
United States had acted with the wisdom of Solomon, the unwisdom of Cubans
may have counteracted our efforts.
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The foreign policy of the United States in regard to Cuba and indeed
much of the world, has been ambivalent to change. The twentieth century
has brought an awakening of nationalistic movements, demand for cultural
change, quest for higher living standards and a profound desire to escape
from political and economic subordination to industrialized nations.
Change has been the very keystone of the century.
While professing commitment to the ideal of self determination, the
United States has often tended to support the status quo. The United
States has often enshrined stability in time of rapid change and as a
result, Cuba and other nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America look else-
where for support and leadership.
One of the major factors behind this status quo policy is the inter-
national business interests of the United States. Political revolutions
against dictators are generally supported by the United States. In the
twentieth century, however, these revolutions often encompass social and
economic changes and when these changes threaten substantial economic
interests the ardent support of the United States often tends to fade.
Emerging nations in order to quickly end economic domination often resort
to expropriation of foreign holdings. Since the advancement and protection
of overseas business is a major concern of the United States government such
revolutions have been eyed with a great deal of concern.
There is nothing wrong in America having overseas business interests.
Such activities are vital to this nation's welfare and often provide
valuable economic assistance to other nations. The problem, which is diffi-
cult to resolve, is that protection of economic interests often conflicts
with the national ideal of self determination. In many instances, and Cuba
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in particular, the United States has opted to protect business holdings
through preservation of the political status quo. By ignoring the
aspirations, needs and problems of the Cuban people, the United States not
only lost their respect and friendship but also, eventually, large economic
holdings. But, by far, the greatest loss has been in terms of international
prestige.
Positive policies of economic aid and active support for social and
economic reform provide an alternative to complete loss of economic hold-
ings and Communist domination. There can be no guarantee that such a
program would be 100 percent effective but it does appear to be a much
more realistic scheme than blindly branding any movement that threatens the
"way things are" as immoral or illegal. We shouldn't forget the American
Revolution was not exactly legal in the eyes of the English.
Such a proposal does not mean the United States should acquiesce and
submit to every disgruntled revolutionist who comes on the scene. It does
mean we may have to suffer short term economic set-backs in order to retain
long term friendship. Friendship is not an end in itself. The United
States must determine where its strategic, economic and political interests
lie and with these nations it must make every effort to gain a perfect know-
ledge of the problems and aspirations of its people. Armed with this in-
formation, it should be possible to formulate policies which would not only
protect American interests (in the long run) but also succor that nation's
desires without humiliating or denigrating the prestige of the United States.
What is so tragic in the story of Cuban-American relations is that
regardless of events, the United States is not an imperialistic nation. The
State Department does not want to run Cuba (the CIA may be a different matter)

37
nor does it have aggressive designs. If it did, Cuba could have been a
commonwealth or even a state years ago. The basic problem with Cuba has
not been evil intent on the part of the United States but rather a pro-
found misunderstanding of values coupled with the smug certainty that the
ideals of democracy, capitalism and progress were the cure for all ills




Regardless of past policy failure, Communist conspiracies, Castro's
xenophobia or any number of other excuses, the fact remains that Cuba is
ruled by a dictatorial demagogue whose presence is an embarrassment to
the United States and a potential threat to national security. The
problem now is to determine where our national interests lie in relation
to Cuba and then seek alternative solutions to promote those interests.
The real question is how do we now deal with Castro?
Cuba is aligned with a foreign power that is dedicated to the destruction
of American democracy. Soviet military personnel serve in advisory capacities
to Cuba's sizeable, well trained, well equipped army. Soviet Russia has
attempted to capitalize on the geographic position of the island to alter
the world balance of power by neutralizing some of the strategic advantages
the United States has enjoyed in overseas bases and missile strength.
Cuba's armed forces of course, regardless of their strength or ability,
pose little threat to the United States. In a conventional war, Cuba could
at best, provide a diversionary effort. The island could be easily
neutralized but not without cost of lives and equipment. In terms of nuclear
war, the island's location gives Russia the advantage of dispersal for its
weapon systems. Close proximity to the United States -gives an added advantage
in that relatively cheap, more accurate, short range or intermediate range
missiles may be effectively deployed against the United States. The missile
crisis dramatically demonstrated that it is possible to secretly transport
and emplace nuclear missiles. In a one shot nuclear war, such missiles could
have devastating results for the United States. In this context, the island
has assumed major strategic importance.
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The potential military use of the island is, however, far over-
shadowed by the political and psychological significance of a communist
bastion in the Western Hemisphere. Within Latin America, Castro has
caused fear of spreading communism but at the same time, generated respect
for his defiance of the United States and a healthy regard for Russian
power.
There are many uses to which Cuba could be put by the Russians:
Missile base, naval base, intelligence center, tracking station and base
for subversion come readily to mind. Already Cuba has experimented with
many of these employments. As a base for subversion, Cuba has been success-
ful in supplying men and equipment to cause trouble in the Dominican
Republic, Venezuela, Panama, Bolivia and Chile. It is in this regard that
Cuba poses its greatest threat to Latin America. Any attempt at large scale
military invasion of another nation could be easily thwarted by the United
States but covert infiltration of propaganda, sabotage and guerrillas is
almost impossible to control.
For use by the United States, Cuba has little to offer. Guantanamo Bay
(Gitmo) is presently used for fleet refresher training and could easily be
replaced by Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. As a base for long range patrol
or for staging troops and equipment for Latin America deployment, Florida
or Puerto Rico offer equal facilities. The island's time honored role of
protecting the Panama Canal would be meaningless in a nuclear war and very
minor in conventional conflict involving aircraft carriers and submarines.
The proposed sea-level canal would further obviate any need for perimeter
defense.
The Cuban situation even if exploited to its fullest, could probably
not effect the world balance of power. The strategic power of the United
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States does not depend on what happens in Cuba. A strong Soviet military
power in Cuba could, however, divert sizeable segments of United States'
military forces and the island could become a political pawn in, for in-
to
stance, another Berlin crisis. Cuba is not necessary to the United
States as a base but in order to preclude future alarms and veiled threats
to United States' security, Cuba should be denied as a base to a potential
enemy.
From a commercial viewpoint, Cuba has no overpowering value. After
all, the United States has lived successfully for several years without
benefit of Cuban trade. There is no denying that access to Cuban markets
would be welcomed by United States' business, a market is a market, and
businessmen and the United States' government are keenly aware that expan-
sion is one answer to declining profits and restoration of a favorable trade
balance.
Future mercantile transactions could not approach pre-Castro levels.
Russian, British, French and Chinese products have been pouring into Cuba
for years and it is not reasonable to believe that these goods or their
spare parts could be completely replaced by United States products. Cuban
sugar has long been replaced by Latin American and United States' sources.
If Cuban sugar were to again be available, the United States could not
purchase amounts equal to pre-1959 levels without; alienating our present
suppliers. Since sugar remains the major cash product of Cuba, whoever
purchases the majority of Cuban sugar will also most probably be the major
supplier of commodities to Cuba.
Finally it would not seem likely that American investors would again
gamble large sums in a nation with Cuba's history of expropriation and debt
Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective," in Cuba and the United States
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repudiation. Even if American business was willing, we cannot gauge how
readily Cubans would accept United States' investment after years of a
"Cuba-si - Yanqui no" national philosophy.
The importance of Cuba then is not so much what it is but what it
represents. Americans, unlike most Europeans, are not used to hostile
neighbors. We shudder to think of an "enemy" just ninety miles away.
Whether that "enemy" has any viable threat potential does not really
matter. Cuba and Castro represent a foreign intrusion into an area which
Americans have historically felt was their own. For this reason alone,
Americans will not be quick to forgive, or seek reconciliation with Cuba.
There are too many variables to make any specific speculation about
the future of Cuba a profitable exercise. An assassin's bullet would throw
Cuba into chaos. Or a serious split among the government hierchy could
weaken the regime's strength to near impotence. Should the Soviet Union
change its policy -of supplying Cuba, Castro may be forced to renegotiate his
relations with the United States and Latin America in order to survive.
Within the Caribbean, Cuba is the most viable nation state. By
virtue of her geographic size, population, military strength and agricultural
potential she is the only unit, with the possible exception of Puerto Rico,
which makes any real sense as an independent nation. The remaining nations
of the area while possessing desire, strong nationalistic tendencies and in
some cases, competent leadership, simply do not have the necessary size,
economic potential or population to be meaningful members of the inter-
national community. If this be true, then Cuba can be expected to eventu-
ally assert her position as a leader in the Caribbean. To some extent,
this has already been tried via the active, though generally ineffective
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attempts to export Cuban politics. When the euphoria of a successful
revolution wears off and Cuba finally realizes she is again a colony (of
the USSR) it might be expected that Cuba will make an effort to rejoin
the Caribbean community in some sort of regional alliance. Some form of
Caribbean "common market" or a regional political body may benefit the
Caribbean nations. United action by a heterogenous collection of nations
is difficult to attain but one must only look at the European Common Market
to see a model of what can be done.
In a speech on March 25, 1964, Senator J. William Fulbright listed
three options for dealing with Castro and Cuba: invasion, economic boycott
69
or acceptance of Castro as a disagreeble reality. None of these alter-
natives appear to be either practical or possible.
Unilateral armed intervention is no longer a plausible choice. Such
action would be in violation of the Charter of the Organization of American
States and would also be a renunciation of America's pledge not to invade
Cuba. Such a pledge was given to the U.S.S.R. in return for Soviet with-
drawal of offensive missiles in 1962. Moreover, such intervention would
most certainly be interpreted as an aggressive act by the Latin American
nations and would bring condemnation from the Afro-Asian bloc. Regardless
of our military power, invasion is no longer a viable instrument of foreign
policy unless it is performed with devastating finality.
Economic boycott has not proved to be effective. England, France and
Canada who are numbered among our allies have continued to trade with Cuba
in defiance of United States' wishes. The support of the Soviet Union, of
course, has prevented disaster within Cuba and effectively nullified the
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United States' boycott. Fulbright.'s use of the word "acceptance" seems
to imply some stronger action than simply recognizing that Castro exists.
The implication is that America's third option is to actively and materi-
ally deal with the Cuban government. Such a policy, if initiated by the
United States, would certainly be viewed in Latin America as weakness and
humiliating defeat for the United States.
There is yet another policy option available to Washington's policy
makers. Rapprochement with the major communist powers is currently a
popular mode of foreign policy even though substantive results are not yet
clear. Several factors, such as the expected gains and losses, methods of
initiating rapprochement and Castro's reaction to such a move must be care-
fully considered before embarking upon such a course.
On the plus side of the ledger it would seem that an accord with Castro
would remove a source of potential friction between the United' States and
the Soviet Union. " Second, in terms of hemispheric solidarity, the agri-
cultural and industrial potential of Cuba is of inestimable value to the
development of some form of Caribbean trade or even political alliance.
Were Cuba to rejoin the Caribbean, it would be possible to make long range
economic plans which would fit Cuba's capabilities and limitations to the
broader regional pattern in the interest of the greatest welfare for the
whole area. Third, a relaxation of the United States' attitude toward
Cuba would ease relations with our allies who have continued trade with
Cuba against United States wishes. Third World nations might also become
more amenable to United States overtures if they no longer viewed Cuba as
a victim of U.S. aggression. Finally, an accommodation with Cuba would
most probably eliminate a large part of the skyjacking problem.
John Plank, "We Should Start Talking With Cuba," New York Times Magazine
(March 30, 1969), pp. 87, 89.
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On the debit side, an accommodation with Castro would carry heavy
costs for the United States. The costs would not be great in terms of
national security. Cuba does not pose a conventional threat and the
resolution of the missile crisis has, for the most part, eliminated a
strategic threat. The real costs of an accord with Cuba would be political
and ideological. When the United States talks with the U.S.S.R. and China,
the concerned parties all being acknowledged major world powers engage in
the give and take of equals. Should the United States attempt accommodation
with Cuba it would have to be prepared to treat Castro as a peer also. Such
a move would certainly be interpreted at home, most of Latin America and
the world, as a tacit admission of failure and defeat of the United States
by a fourth rate power. The hemisphere could conceivably be split asunder
as the rightist regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Guatemala and others cooled their relations with the United States. Leftist
elements might also become mean, suspicious and mischievous if accord appears
possible and they would no longer be able to gather popular support by
picturing the United States as a reactionary, imperialist nation. Finally,
accord would demonstrate that America's contention that Castro's ideology
was alien and dangerous to the values and interests of the Western
Hemisphere was false.
Should rapprochment , even with its high cost in national prestige, be
attempted the next question is how to achieve that goal without the appear-
ance of being a petitioner at Castro's doorstep. It is impossible to fore-
cast in what manner the process may begin, but it is safe to assume the






opening. Each attempt must be examined in light of its advantages to each
side and each attempt will also be carefully scrutinized by the Soviet
Union.
Fidel Castro's response to an American invitation to negotiation is
equally difficult to foretell. So far as is known, he has shown no inter-
est in discussing common problems with the United States, nor, with the
exception of a few triumphal tours of leftist states, has he been willing
to conduct serious discussion with other Latin American nations. Should
Castro consider America's willingness to negotiate as a surrender he will
no doubt, be less than gracious in his victory. Such behavior would
probably nullify the preceding diplomatic groundwork and effectively stall
any substantive agreements. Castro, also is subject to strong influences
which mightpreclude his involvement in negotiations regardless of his per-
sonal desires. For years he has publicly expressed hatred and defiance
toward the United States and its ideals. Freedom from economic and political
dependence on the United States has been one of the cornerstones of his
revolutionary movement and any relaxation of these attitudes might be
viewed as betrayal by his followers. In view of all this, the prospects
for an immediate and substantial improvement of relations are not very bright,
If this rather gloomy analysis is correct, we can expect Fidel Castro
to remain defiantly on his island for a long time. It is difficult to
envision, however, an elderly Fidel Castro delivering rabidly fanatic anti-
American harrangues to an enthralled and worshipful nation, unless his
economic reforms overcome the paralysis with which they are afflicted. It
is also difficult to envision the Soviet Union continuing to pour a million
dollars a day into a doddering nation which it knows the United States will
never allow to be used to full military advantage.
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Time appears to be on the side of the United States. One might
expect Castro to eventually make a fatal mistake which would lead to
his destruction or be forced to seek help from the nations of the
Western Hemisphere. If such be the case, the United States is presently
following the right course of action.
Bayless Manning neatly summarizes:
That policy consists of an inflexible posture vis-a-vis
Guantanamo; . . . steady diplomatic and economic pressure
to the extent (which will be increasingly limited) that
we can persuade others to cooperate with us; the closest
possible collaboration with the other countries of Latin
America to forge a whole new environment in the hemisphere
through the Alliance for Progress; a clear, steady signal
to the Soviet Union to stay out of the Caribbean; and a
stiff policy of containment against Castroite subversion in
other parts of Latin America. "72
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